Abstract: This paper assesses the political and socio-economic consequences of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in Honduras. The analysis uses several techniques (poverty narratives, stakeholder analysis and taxonomy analysis) and quantitative and qualitative data (socioeconomic indicators, PRS spending execution and interviews with stakeholders). It argues that the PRS constitutes a missed opportunity to widen further the political space in which poverty reduction is formulated and to deliver pro-poor growth. The inclusion of multiple actors with different interests, capacities and influence led to a consensus too imprecise to articulate a set of priorities, left alone a pro-poor growth agenda. Recently, by shifting unilaterally the growth pillar of the PRS towards infrastructure investments and trade integration, Honduras may have lost yet another opportunity to support a truly participatory democracy.
Political Space, Pro-Poor Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Honduras 1. Introduction
More than five years after the appearance of the first Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), whatever enthusiasm was originally generated has given way to gloomy evaluations. and growth content, fare in the Honduran case. It also explores the political set-up prior to the PRS and how this affected its shaping. The paper argues that the PRS process has consolidated the political space opened a decade ago with the burgeoning of new civil networks but has failed to widen it further. Ironically, by including everyone in the dialogue process and almost no one in the formulation of the PRSP, the PRS missed the opportunity to be a truly participatory exercise.
Also, the process produced a strategy too imprecise to be effective in either reducing poverty or stepping up economic growth. The paper further argues that the political space factor may prove to be more significant in the future reduction of poverty. New strategies for economic growth are already in place but without a more participatory political space, factors such as lack of ownership and commitment or the erosion of democratic legitimacy may derail future pro-poor growth efforts.
The paper uses several methodologies to analyse this hypothesis. It utilises available official information on performance regarding poverty and other social indicators (including economic growth and PRSP spending execution, among others) as well as perceptions and opinions collected from interviews with key stakeholders of the Honduran PRS process conducted over the course of two years. In order to give shape to both the politics and economics driving the PRS process, the paper uses poverty narratives, 8 stakeholder analysis, statistical comparisons and a taxonomy analysis of growth potential adapted from Behrman. 9 .
The next section recounts key antecedents on the opening of the political space in
Honduras and the role that poverty and economic reforms have played in that process. Section 3 focuses on the content flaws of the Strategy and its 'convenient' lack of priorities to ensure a broad consensus. Section 4 reviews available empirical evidence to conclude that the PRS has not achieved its established goals, especially poverty reduction and economic growth. Having analysed the consequences of the process to date, Section 5 explores the prospects of the 'revised'
PRSP to effectively support pro-poor growth, but finds little ground for the official optimism.
Section 6 provides some final remarks. 
Widening the Political Space in
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Sustained and rapid economic growth was identified as the backbone of a successful PRS in Honduras and elsewhere. In articulating a pro-poor growth, the original strategy brought together the traditional macroeconomic conditionality present in the faltered first wave of structural reforms in the 1990s (i.e., fiscal discipline, privatisation, liberalisation, and exchange rate adjustments) with widespread institutional reforms and pro-poor spending targets. An unprecedented feature of the HIPC-PRS process in Honduras and elsewhere is that conditionality would now promote a wider participation of governments, donors and local civil society groups.
The participatory elaboration of the PRSP was expected to lead to a perception of national 'ownership' and therefore, advocates claim, to sustainability over time.
These expectations now seem too ambitious and optimistic, especially after taking into consideration the socio-political and economic history of the country. are not delivering, they may also be contributing to the erosion of democratic legitimacy .
Although reforms have significantly reshaped some areas of the economy, 20 they have been incomplete and unable to mitigate the vulnerability and volatility of the economy in Paradoxically, by delivering further economic well-being, political aspirations rise in line with higher stability. If they suppress political aspirations, stability is compromised. 20 Price-setting public agencies were dismantled; an export led growth strategy was launched; the long-standing fixed exchange rate regime was lifted. The PRS process failed to tackle upfront two critical aspects, which were ultimately to reduce its capacity to deliver its goals. The first of these was the representation issue, the second (and related) issue was the trade-off between consensus and precision in the formulation of a strategy. Neither the PRSP nor any background documents of the PRS process define mechanisms to select civil society representatives to be part of the dialogue. Instead, participants of 22 different sectors (considered in Honduras to constitute civil society) were invited to participate in the dialogue process. All of the great and influential civil society organisations, including critical organisations, were included. Interviews with stakeholders confirmed the perception that none of the major players was excluded from the dialogue process. But this policy of inclusion led to problems of its own, and the failure to resolve the representation issue more selectively had significant consequences. By mingling heterogeneous groups in terms of ideology, capacity, expectations and interests, the resulting consensus lacked precision and priorities -the second problem highlighted above. The long routes taken during the PRS process to reach very broad consensus led to a failure to prioritise and detail specific policies. This, along with the lack of a common agenda among the civil society participants, was convenient for the Government, which used it as a justification to pursue a top-down approach, with the inclusion in the eleventh hour of a non-negotiated macroeconomic framework and the approval of the PRSP without a finalised monitoring system -an instrument which was expected to boost social control and accountability and to confer a critical role to civil society.
In addition to the lack of priorities, the contents of the PRSP are marked by a number of shortcomings, limiting its effectiveness in supporting pro-poor growth and poverty reduction.
First, although the PRSP recognises the multiple dimensions of poverty, it restricts its analysis to monetary metrics. Second, although the PRSP contextualises poverty reduction strategies over time, it fails to critically evaluate the capacity of liberalising policies aimed at curbing poverty throughout the 1990s. Instead, it takes for granted that textbook policies will achieve the highly ambitious goals consistent with an over-optimistic macroeconomic framework. Third, the PRSP However, Congress is instrumental in approving the reforms needed for the implementation of the PRS effective. The role played by local governments, the Church and the media in the conception of the PRS is also characterised by limited influence, although they are all key stakeholders in its implementation.
Has the PRS Achieved its Goals?
In spite of the limitations mentioned above, the implementation of the PRS has resulted in some notable progress. This section argues, however, that this progress cannot hide the failure of the Strategy to deliver its higher 'goods', that is, poverty reduction and economic growth.
The most significant progress has been made on institutional development and good Table 1 ). and sustainability. This is, however, hardly good news for pro-poor growth as most of the discrepancies concentrate on human capital investments (203 million dollars).
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< Table 1 This is all the more relevant given that other PRS goals related to education (pre-basic enrolment and secondary enrolment of a growing population), access to electricity, telephone coverage, environmental vulnerability and gender were achieved. This is not to say that all PRSP goals apart from poverty reduction were achieved: primary education, access to safe water and sanitation and gender empowerment performed below expectations in both years (see Table 2 ).
< Table 2 about here > 32 Republic of Honduras, 'Alcanzando las Metas de la Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza'. 33 Republic of Honduras, 'Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza', argues that the main reason for these differences is the adoption later during that year of a new definition of poverty spending that recognised only public education and health salaries up to 3.5 and 5 times the average GDP per capita, respectively, as poverty-related.
Is Honduras a special case among HIPC-PRS countries, at least in the Latin American region? Has the region as a whole performed better than Honduras and other HIPC-PRS countries? Table 3 provides period averages on key performance indicators before and after countries reached their initial decision points (that is, their national PRSPs were approved).
The year of 1998 is considered the key point for the region as a whole as Guyana and Bolivia reached their decision points in that year. Table 3 shows that, with the exception of Bolivia, per capita debt service in the Latin American HIPC-PRS countries has declined since their eligibility.
That reduction is significant because it has taken place in a period when debt service increased including Honduras. All in all, while the HIPC-PRS initiative appears to have facilitated debt service reduction and social spending increases, economic growth has not picked up as expected.
< Table 3 about here >
A 'Revised' PRSP and its Future Prospects
Having concluded that the PRS has neither widened the political space in Honduras nor supported the expected pro-poor growth, this section focuses on future prospects. In particular, it centres on the potential for a 'revised' PRSP to help deliver the ambitious growth and poverty goals.
Interestingly, changes have taken place in the contents of the original PRSP rather than in the other aspects of the PRS process. More specifically, the PRSP has shifted its strategic emphasis onto the economic growth pillar. In order to analyse such changes, two studies have developed a methodology to determine the prospective impacts of pro-poor growth proposals. 34 The methodology consists of mapping the likely location of interventions within a two-dimensional space delimited by efficiency and poverty impacts. The aggregated impact of a given policy will be determined by the sum of several impacts resulting from various aspects of the policy.
Although it is not possible to determine quantitatively the total aggregate effect of a given policy, its mapping shows at least whether all the impacts considered will work in similar or in opposite directions. The analysis is of course tentative, not least because most of the Honduran initiatives are in their initial stages of implementation. Also, the selection of policy aspects is illustrative rather than exhaustive and is mainly determined by available knowledge on the formulation of the policy. For these reasons, the expected magnitude of the impacts of such interventions is difficult to spell out. Notwithstanding those difficulties, the mapping of several strategies allows us to systematise both the potentialities and limitations that each initiative faces in order to become pro-poor (see Figure 1) . Finally, the analysis assumes that political and institutional conditions in the country are such that the proposed interventions are feasible. Although this is not necessarily realistic in the immediate future for all the policies, this assumption is likely to hold in the medium to long term. The very survival of the PRS would itself be taken as an indication of a national commitment to carry out these reforms.
As In spite of these alleged pro-poor growth strategies, doubts linger as to their (re)distributive impacts. First, it is not clear that the improvement of economic infrastructure will disproportionately improve the livelihoods of the poorest. This will only be the case if may not be significant. Which of these features prevail is an empirical question that will depend on the final design and implementation of the initiatives. Ultimately, the specific design and implementation will determine whether or not a policy proposal results in pro-poor growth. There is certainly no reason for an unambiguous optimism regarding the capacity of these policies to support pro-poor growth: the enabling conditions that would shift each policy towards the propoor growth quadrant still need to be established.
< Figure 1 about here>
Final remarks
The HIPC-PRS process has facilitated the reduction of debt service and the increase of social spending in Honduras and has consolidated the wider political space enjoyed by its society since the late 1990s. However, the PRS constitutes a missed opportunity to expand this political space still further, to increase the participation of the Honduran civil society and to support pro-poor growth. Not only has the PRS failed to provide a new pro-poor growth strategy (borrowing instead from a flawed economic model which delivered neither substantive economic growth nor poverty reduction), but it also lacks policy priorities. This lack of strategic priorities is the price it has paid for a PRS process which was all-inclusive in the consultative phase, but very narrow in its decision-making. As a result, the PRS has not inspired a sense of national ownership, and doubts about its future relevance are increasing. Worryingly, history appears to be repeating itself. The revitalized official optimism in the capacity of the 'revised' PRSP to unequivocally support pro-poor growth seems unjustified. The shift in emphasis towards infrastructure investments and trade integration has not been yet developed sufficiently as to prove either financially sustainable or supportive of pro-poor growth. Furthermore, its formulation process makes the 'revised' PRSP another missed opportunity for widening further the country's political space. Even if Honduras eventually gets closer to supporting pro-poor growth, its political transition towards a more participatory democracy will remain incomplete unless more efforts are put into increasing this political space.
"Figure 1: Potentialities and Risks Associated with Pro-poor Growth Strategies in Honduras"
Cost reduction; Better access to distribution channels; More sector integration. 
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